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On Raymond Williams: Complexity, Immanence, and the 
Long Revolution
Daniel Hartley
The work of Raymond Williams is at risk of becoming residual at the very historical 
moment it could enable true emergence.1 From the current explosion of social 
reproduction theory to the nascent development of world-ecology, from the gradual 
break-up of Britain that has enabled the emergence of socialist-inflected nationalisms, 
to the wave of collective struggles that have exploded across the world since 2011, 
the work of Raymond Williams has “got there before us again”2 and is now more 
timely than ever. 3 Yet the commentary on Williams — as in Geoff Dyer’s recent 
introduction to Verso’s important reissue of Politics and Letters — is often bogged 
down in sentimental biographical nostalgia. This ‘residual’ construction of Williams 
is drastically partial:4 it focuses solely on those passages of his work emphasising the 
importance of ‘experience’ or autobiography, failing to connect them to the broader 
project of politico-philosophical speculation in which they are embedded. Even more 
insidiously, Tristram Hunt’s recent article on the occasion of the Penguin Vintage 
Classics reissue of The Country and the City attempts to co-opt Williams into a project 
of reconstitution of English national identity — the very Englishness that Williams, a 
self-described “Welsh European,” consistently revealed to be part of a specific ruling-
class formation.5 Hunt goes so far as to suggest — bizarrely — that Williams’s work 
would have provided a much-needed dose of “realism” to Occupy protestors led astray 
by the utopian pronouncements of Antonio Negri and David Graeber.
The present article attempts to counteract this dual tendency of residualisation 
and incorporation by reconstructing the systematic unity of Williams’s life’s work.6 
While this runs the risk of a certain ‘synchronic’ or — in Williams’s terms — ‘epochal’ 
bias, it is necessary if we are to retain a sense of the wholeness of Williams’s vision. 
To do so is important both to our sense of his overall political project and, arguably, to 
our capacity to think and intervene in the complicated totality of our own historical 
present. In other words, I believe that reconstructing a sense of the integral whole of 
Williams’s oeuvre is a precondition of his continued actuality — a necessary ground-
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clearing operation prior to more substantial elaborations of Williams’s multiple 
connections to our contemporary concerns. One way of articulating this wholeness 
is via two seemingly banal maxims that I believe inform his work at all levels: Firstly, 
the world is more complex than you think it is (the maxim of complexity); secondly, 
you are in it (the maxim of immanence). 
For the remainder of the article I shall attempt to educe the meanings of these 
two maxims and the ways in which they inform his theory of the ‘long revolution.’ 
In doing so, I hope to shed new light on some of his best-known concepts, such as the 
‘structure of feeling,’ and to emphasise aspects of his work that have been hitherto 
neglected — not least the centrality of his lifelong engagement with naturalist drama. 
What follows is not intended as an introduction to his work, nor should it be taken to 
suggest that the maxims of complexity and immanence usurp other more canonical 
concepts (e.g., “cultural materialism” or “dominant, residual, and emergent”) as the 
“keywords” of Williams’s oeuvre. Rather, it is an attempt to articulate the informing 
logic that unifies and animates his overall project.
Maxim of Complexity
The word “complexity” has its own complex history. Originating in the Latin complexus, 
the past participle of complectere meaning “embrace” or “comprise,” ‘complex’ entered 
the English language in the mid-seventeenth century. It rose to prominence as a 
theoretical term in the fields of philosophy of science and cybernetics in the mid-
twentieth century. In an article entitled “Science and Complexity” (1948), Warren 
Weaver argued that science up to 1900 had focused on “problems of simplicity” 
involving only two variables, whereas the science of the first half of the twentieth 
century had developed powerful techniques of probability theory and statistical 
mechanics to deal with “problems of disorganized complexity” comprising billions 
of variables.7 The task for the coming decades was then to devise a method for 
understanding mid-range complexity, located between simplicity and disorganized 
complexity, which he called “organized complexity.”8 For Weaver, complexity is thus 
a problem of scientific epistemology and method, linked primarily to situations 
comprising multiple variables.
In the sociology of Niklas Luhmann, however, complexity assumes a different 
meaning. Influenced by Talcott Parsons’s ‘structural functionalism,’ Luhmann 
came to define the problem of complexity as that “of the threshold beyond which 
each element [of an environment] can no longer be connected with every other.”9 
This “enforces selectivity, which in turn leads to a reduction of complexity via the 
formation of systems that are less complex than their environment.”10 Complexity for 
Luhmann is thus not so much an ontological condition as the retrospective projection 
of that from which a system differentiates itself. A system exists only to the extent 
that it maintains this process of self-differentiation; social systems are ultimately 
nothing but internally automated operations of self-reproduction. Perry Anderson 
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has provocatively described Luhmann’s sociology as a “tacit construction of the Bonn 
Republic as a matter-of-fact complex of so many mechanisms of technocratic routine.”11 
Where Parsons’s structural functionalism, purged of all social contradiction, was a 
sociology appropriate to “the optimism of American capitalism in the epoch of its 
world supremacy,”12 Luhmann’s was a “saturnine variant” of Parsons, correlative to 
a Federal Republic based on consensus and “devoted to banality and blandness.”13 
This schematic overview is intended simply to suggest that the maxim of 
complexity informing Williams’s work bears no substantial or political relation to 
Luhmannian sociology or systems theory more generally.14 Complexity in the work 
of Williams is part of “lived culture”15 or “the socio-cultural process,”16 which consists 
of a potentially infinite number of social and artistic practices, relationships, values, 
and documents. The potential infinity of practices and values naturally exceeds the 
documents in which they are recorded. This means that from one historical period to 
another, all that will survive of the previous period is its “recorded culture.”17 Yet the 
very survival of recorded culture depends on the construction of what Williams calls 
“selective traditions”: “an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and pre-
shaped present,” it is not a neutral selection from previous periods, but “a version of 
the past which is intended to connect with and ratify the present.”18 Thus, Williams’s 
social ontology always presupposes two interconnecting levels: a present in which 
the totality of potentially infinite social relationships and activities intersect, and an 
overdetermination of this present by a selective tradition, which is active within it 
and attempts to suture it to a selected past. Our contact with the past is then doubly 
limited: the recorded culture of any period is only a very small part of its total human 
activity, but even this part has been radically selected by the selective tradition. 
Hence the political importance of the maxim of complexity, encapsulated in one of 
the most emphatic passages of Williams’s oeuvre: “no mode of production and therefore 
no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or 
exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human intention.”19 Neither a problem 
of epistemology nor an excess of environment over system, complexity for Williams 
is the socio-ontological fact of the potential infinity — and infinite multiplicity — of 
human practices.
Williams’s emphasis on complexity is both political and methodological: it is an 
attempt to produce a theory adequate to the discontinuities and potentialities of 
the present with a view to intervening into it towards a complex, common future. In 
developing and refining his major conceptual innovation, the “structure of feeling,” 
Williams would further elaborate his theory of those elements of social complexity that 
are usually overlooked by what he calls “epochal” analysis.20 The latter treats cultural 
processes as systems, thereby perpetuating the politically and methodologically 
fatal notion that dominant social orders do in fact exhaust all human practice and 
intention. As we shall see, his attack on epochal analysis is critical not only to his 
attempt to locate sources of resistance in the present, but also to his understanding 
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of the post-revolutionary process which, if it is to endure, must not be reduced to the 
simple seizure — and subsequent optimistic withering — of state power.
By the time of Marxism and Literature, Williams had come to define structure 
of feeling as “social experiences in solution, as distinct from other social semantic 
formations which have been precipitated and are more evidently and more immediately 
available.”21 He was concerned to capture those elements of social life which are still 
in process, still emergent, and which are irreducible to pre-existent (“precipitated”) 
modes of thought or representation, but which are nonetheless not pure anarchic 
flux: they possess a “structure of particular linkages, particular emphases and 
suppressions”22 and “specific internal relations.”23
Williams developed the concept of ‘structure of feeling’ through a lifelong 
investigation of the politico-philosophical implications of literary style. This is clear 
from one of his earliest formulations of the concept:
All serious thinking about art must begin from two apparently 
contradictory facts: that an important work is always, in an irreducible 
sense, individual; and yet that there are authentic communities of works 
of art, in kinds, periods and styles … The individual dramatist has done 
this, yet what he [sic] has done is part of what we then know about a 
general period or style.
It is to explore this essential relationship that I use the term “structure 
of feeling.”24
Structure of feeling is thus located at the crossroads of two problems commonly 
associated with style. The first concerns individual style: the precise relation of 
an individual work or writer to collective literary conventions such as forms and 
genres. The second pertains to period style, or the general issue of periodizing and 
of generationality as such — that ineffable quality common to a distinct number of 
disparate phenomena at a certain point in time. In teasing out some of the wider 
implications of these issues, I shall refer to the first as the problem of transindividual 
subjectivity, and the second as that of historical temporality.
Williams’s theory of style began with an investigation of the problem of speech 
in naturalist drama. Drawing on and criticizing the ideologies of language contained 
in the Leavisite journal Scrutiny and the influential writings of T. S. Eliot, he argued 
that the basic problem faced by dramatists (traced throughout Drama From Ibsen to 
Brecht [1968]) is that “once a certain level of conversational speech is set, you can 
never move beyond it: people are confined to its limits at moments when a greater 
intensity of expression is needed.”25 At the other extreme, however, “[w]hat becomes 
intolerable is either the adoption of an overall verse form which pitches everything 
at the level of myth, or the descent from the metaphysical to the trivial within a 
43Complexity, Immanence, and the Long Revolution
uniform verse medium, such as you find in Eliot’s later plays.”26 Thus, if a dramatist 
faithfully reproduces probable human speech, she risks an inadequacy of expression 
at crucial moments of intensity, but if she pitches her diction at too uniformly formal 
a level, she risks either negating the naturalist ideals of verisimilitude or of inviting 
comically bathetic switches from the sublime to the everyday.27 It is no wonder, then, 
that Williams’s implicit ideal of dramatic speech, from first to last, was an integration 
of multiple stylistic levels. Such an ideal would aim to produce a style adequate to the 
expression of the entire range of human feeling, from the seemingly most personal 
and pre-conscious affective fluctuation to the most officially, formally, and publicly 
recognized emotions.
Williams had long noticed the significance in naturalist drama of the domestic 
setting:
It is perhaps a particular stage of bourgeois society, in which the decisive 
action is elsewhere, and what is lived out, in these traps of rooms, are 
the human consequences: in particular, the consequences of a relatively 
leisured society. To stare from a window at where one’s life is being 
decided: that consciousness is specific […] The rooms are not there to 
define the people, but to define what they seem to be, what they cannot 
accept they are.28
Contrary to ancient Greek drama, which was characterised by an innate total stylistic 
integration,29 the linguistic embodiment of this bourgeois structure of feeling is 
a style condemned to superficiality, one that is forced to hint at hidden depths of 
experience beneath what is actually articulated, and in constant danger of mere 
“wished significance.”30 As Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko once observed of the 
plays of Chekov, “[t]he dialogue the author has written is merely a pale reflection of 
those emotions, their outward manifestation, which still leaves a great deal over.”31 
That Williams felt this was an untenable situation is significant for two reasons. 
Firstly, it was central to his whole conception of drama, in that his work exhibited 
a lifelong search for styles that would embody a “total form”— a modern equivalent 
of the ancient Greek totality of expression.32 Yet it was also a constitutive aspect 
of his sustained critique of contemporary Marxist approaches to culture (which, 
in his view, were essentially variations on the base-superstructure model). These 
approaches all depended on “a known history, a known structure, known products”33 — 
on internally complete systems of thought with an assumed fully achieved articulation 
without remainder. What such approaches to culture thus ignored was precisely that 
realm of pre-articulated transindividual experience at which naturalist drama was 
constantly forced to hint and in response to which Williams developed his theory 
of the “structure of feeling”: “social experiences in solution, as distinct from other 
social semantic formations which have been precipitated and are evidently and more 
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immediately available.”34 Thus, Williams’s recognition of the constitutive inadequacy 
of linguistic expression in early naturalist drama simultaneously provided his key 
line of attack — and, ultimately, the basic trajectory of his attempted reconstruction 
— of Marxist theories of literature and culture. It was also the source of his antipathy 
to those enthusiasts of revolution who believe that the seizure of the organs of the 
state was sufficient to achieving enduring social transformation; what such a view 
underestimates is the hidden depth of our social attachments and alignments — that 
which the eloquent silences of naturalist drama made apparent.
The problem of transindividual experience is also inherently connected to the issue 
of historical temporality. This covers topics ranging from historicism to the nature 
of modernity that arise from the attempt to theorize period styles. In its most basic 
form, it asks how it is possible simultaneously to think the sameness of heterogeneous 
phenomena unified by a single historical principle, and the difference that emerges 
with the advent of historical novelty. Williams attempted to do just this by developing 
a theory of historical temporality based on an expanded notion of inheritance.
When he returned to Cambridge after the war to complete his studies, he felt it had 
become an alien world: the people here seemed to speak a different language from 
the Cambridge he had known before.35 In the context of this feeling of alienation — 
one in which the seemingly unproblematic political optimism of the 1930s had given 
way to a wave of political apostasy — Williams experienced a powerful connection 
to the drama of Ibsen, whom he studied for many months while producing a fifteen 
thousand word thesis for the Tripos. The intensity of this connection is significant: 
Williams says overtly that the central structure of feeling of Ibsen’s plays — that 
everybody is defeated, but that this does not cancel the validity of the impulse that 
moved them — was precisely his own structure of feeling from 1945 to 1951.36 He even 
goes so far as to state that it was Ibsen’s plays which “protected him from the rapid 
retreat from the thirties” which his former Party comrades were now performing, 
and that it was at this time that “a quite different personality emerged, very unlike 
[his] earlier self.”37 The importance of Ibsen’s plays in the formation of Williams’s 
intellectual and political project is thus central because they touched the roots of his 
deepest personal and political commitments.
Their thematic material also provided him with the basis for some of his theoretical 
concepts. That is, Williams translated certain dramatic themes from Ibsen’s plays into 
a theoretical register. The most important of these was the theme of filial inheritance: 
from financial bequeathement and indebtedness to genetic diseases.38 I believe 
there are three reasons why this theme appealed to Williams so intensely. Firstly, 
F. R. Leavis’s mode of literary criticism — the mode which affected Williams most 
deeply — was one based on the construction of lines of literary inheritance, which 
Leavis called either “traditions” or “bearings.”39 Secondly, as we have already seen, 
the situation of postwar Cambridge confronted Williams with the starkest possible 
embodiment of the discrepancy between two generations — that is, his obsession 
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with generationality was born from the unique historical circumstances of his return 
to Cambridge. Finally, as his autobiographical novel, Border Country (1960), testifies, 
Williams himself felt his relation to his own father to be torn between biological 
inheritance and social inheritance, this latter being disrupted by the changing 
patterns of economic development (whereby fathers no longer pass on knowledge 
of a specific trade to a child who will follow in their footsteps). Consequently, Williams 
was attuned to Ibsen’s broadening of ‘inheritance’ from the primarily familial sphere 
to the social sphere more generally. After quoting a key passage from Ibsen’s Ghosts 
— “I almost believe we are all ghosts … It is not only what we have inherited from our 
fathers and mothers that walks in us. It is every kind of dead idea, lifeless old beliefs 
and so on. They are not alive but they cling to us for all that”40 — Williams concludes: 
“We are, Ibsen insists, the creatures of our past. From the moment of our birth we are 
inevitably haunted, by every inherited debt.”41 
Such inherited debts include pre-existing cultural and social forms. Spectre-like, 
they haunt us, urging us to reproduce their modes of sociality. It is then no wonder 
that Williams would later modify Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, which sees “relations 
of domination and subordination … as in effect a saturation of the whole process 
of living,”42 by fusing it with his own tripartite schema of inheritance: dominant, 
residual, and emergent. This schema involves a suturing of past, present and future 
via three modes of presence — three modes in which the present presents itself. There 
are residual social inheritances which “formed in the past,” but which are “still active 
in the cultural process,” and which can offer alternatives to, oppose or reinforce the 
social order;43 the dominant which is a totalizing but non-total incorporation of the 
social as such; and the emergent which is the making-becoming of an alternative 
future — that which the present will bequeath to future generations, provided it 
escapes incorporation into the dominant. The concept of “structure of feeling” is 
applicable primarily to this third mode of presence: “The idea of structure of feeling 
can be specifically related to the evidence of forms and conventions — semantic 
figures — which in art and literature are often among the very first indications that 
such a new structure of feeling is forming.”44
The key to this temporal complexity is its dynamism: the dominant remains 
dominant only insofar as it constantly incorporates emergence. The social hegemon 
must capture all emergent social relations if its own are to remain hegemonic. The 
status quo is never static, but a tireless operation of incorporation. In the literary 
realm, dominant styles and forms maintain their hegemony only to the extent that 
they catch and incorporate all emergent structures of feeling. Moreover, because 
dominant forms embody or imply certain distributions of social relations favorable 
to the ruling class, they act as a cultural bulwark to its state power. Truly emergent 
creation does, however, occur, and it is usually either prefigurative of, contemporary 
with, or an imminent successor to other widespread changes in the social formation 
(this is most obvious at times of social revolution: Romanticism with the French 
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Revolution, Modernism with the Russian). Such creation does not simply reflect these 
emergent forms of life, but directly and immanently embodies them.
There is no better proof of Williams’s conviction in this regard than his work in 
the Workers Educational Association. Sharing that association’s traditional objection 
to “Public Speaking” — “it produces a mechanical voice Style [sic], in the manner 
of an average RADA actress”45 — he invented a course called “Public Expression.” 
Rather than the superficial beautification of speech proposed by traditional public 
speaking courses, his own syllabus was designed specifically to “[equip] members 
of working-class movements for the discharge of actual public responsibilities.”46 
The course was intended as a way of releasing latent social relations and of giving 
linguistic body to working-class consciousness: “Does one impose on a social class 
that is growing in power the syllabus of an older culture; or does one seek means of 
releasing and enriching the life-experience which that rising class brings with it?”47 
Rather than incorporating the working-class students into written and spoken styles 
whose origins lay in the social consciousness of the ruling class and its selective 
tradition, Williams sought to work with his students to enable them to produce styles 
which would be adequate to their unique social experience and would release their 
emergent practical consciousness. For Williams there simply would not be a self-
respecting democratic society until the linguistic and cultural modes of social relation 
immanent to class society were transformed. It is precisely this emphasis on the 
necessary transformation of the whole range of social, cultural and linguistic forms 
that characterizes the expansive social scope of the ‘long revolution.’
Thus, the maxim of complexity — “the world is more complex than you think it 
is” — can now be summarized as follows. Firstly, the potentially infinite multiplicity 
of social practices, relationships, values, and documents exceeds all thought, all 
surviving material artifacts, and all selective traditions that constitute our relation 
to the past. Secondly, social experience is not (yet) entirely articulable; it consists of 
patterned but unspoken or unrecordable elements which elude all known systems 
of thought and expression. Finally, the present is always discontinuous: a battle 
between residual, dominant, and emergent social relations. Together, these practical, 
experiential, and temporal modes of complexity constitute the maxim of complexity 
as such. All three of them are integral to Williams’s theory of the long revolution. 
Before pursuing this line of thought, however, we must now turn to the second maxim 
of Williams’s approach: that of immanence.
Immanence
The term “absolute immanence” first entered the Marxist lexicon via Gramsci’s 
critical reconfiguration of its use by Croce. Gramsci’s aim was to elaborate Marx’s 
second thesis on Feuerbach, in which Marx stresses the secular “this-sidedness” 
[Diesseitigkeit] of thinking, an absolute “being-within-history.”48 Gramsci believed that 
Marx’s inheritance of David Ricardo’s notions of “tendential laws” and “determinate 
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markets” had enabled him to break definitively with the speculative philosophical 
tradition by positing “laws which have a validity within determinate and historically 
limited social formations.”49 Gramsci held that by extending Ricardo’s insights to the 
whole of human history, Marx had produced a new concept of immanence understood 
as a “‘unitary synthetic moment’ which allows the transformation of the three pre-
Marxian movements of classical German philosophy, French politics and classical 
[British] economy into theoretical moments, in relations of continual translation, 
of the philosophy of praxis.”50 Thus, for Gramsci, immanence means the mutual 
imbrication, constitution and translatability of politics, economics and thought 
via the philosophy of praxis. I claim that the principle of immanence informing 
Williams’s work shares crucial similarities to this Gramscian sense of “absolute 
immanence,”51 but that it is supplemented by a stress on existential immanence: the 
political imperative of dwelling (immanere) within (immanere) historical processes. 
Williams himself, however, never refers to his own theories in terms of immanence, 
so my task will be to reconstruct the central immanentist strands of his work in order 
to justify my larger claim. While the principle of immanence informs his work at all 
levels, for the sake of the present article I shall focus solely on his theory of “keywords” 
and his understanding of politics.
Williams describes Keywords (1976) as “the record of an inquiry” into “the [general] 
vocabulary we share with others, often imperfectly, when we wish to discuss our 
common life.”52 He continues: “Every word which I have included has at some time, 
in the course of some argument, virtually forced itself on my attention because the 
problems of its meanings seemed to me inextricably bound up with the problems 
it was being used to discuss.”53 Keywords like “culture” and “society” do not simply 
denote clearly delimitable things within reality (as with nouns like table and chair); 
they are in some sense constitutive of the very conception of reality to which they 
supposedly ‘refer.’ There is thus a clear mutual imbrication between historical 
antagonisms as they exist in ‘reality’ and the concepts which are deployed to think 
them; thought — the domain of concepts — is not transcendent of social being, 
but immanent to it, and this immanence results in a theory of logical coherence 
completely at odds with traditional conceptions of analytic rigour.54 Keywords are “not 
concepts but problems, not analytic problems either but historical movements that 
are still unresolved.”55 These problems cannot be resolved in terms of internal logical 
coherence precisely because they are “historical movements”; they are immanent and 
constitutive factors of ongoing historical struggles. The resolution of these problems 
must then be practical, yet this must not be taken to mean that conceptual thought 
is null and void. On the contrary, precisely because these concepts are constitutive 
factors in the historical process, a conceptualisation of the contradictions they contain 
— That is, a theoretical and philological elaboration — will be a necessary part of 
any practical intervention into those struggles. Theory and practice are not opposed 
here but become two modes of the same historical substance. From the perspective 
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of the long revolution, this would suggest the necessity of a constant vigilance as to 
the very terms in which revolutionary action is conceived. Without it, one risks the 
unwitting inheritance of residual conceptualizations which will internally limit, and 
potentially even defeat, the revolutionary process.56
Immanence, however, is not just a conceptual imperative in Williams’s work; it 
is also a political principle. This can be seen most clearly in his response to Terry 
Eagleton’s now infamous (and parricidal) attack on his former mentor. Having played 
the apprentice to the master from the early 1960s, in 1976 a new, structuralist Eagleton 
— armed with Althusser and Poulantzas — struck out at his one-time mentor in 
an article which gained immediate notoriety.57 He subsequently apologized for the 
occasionally shrill tone of the piece, but to this day stands by much of what he wrote.58 
Eagleton made three major criticisms of Williams’s work: it was reformist, idealist, 
and populist. Williams, claimed Eagleton, had fused Scrutiny’s liberal humanist 
emphasis on the importance of individual experience with those “radical” elements 
of the Romantic “radical-conservative” lineage outlined in Culture and Society which 
could be “ingrafted into a ‘socialist humanism.’”59 This latter, however, was effectively 
a strand of labourist reformism. Indeed, Williams was only able to graft Romantic 
organicism to socialist humanism in the first place precisely because “the working-
class movement is as a matter of historical fact deeply infected with the Carlylean 
and Ruskinian ideology in question.”60 The maneuver was enabled
by the fact that both Romantic and labourist ideologies are in partial 
conflict with bourgeois hegemony; but it is precisely that partiality 
which allows them to embrace. Neither tradition is purely antagonistic 
to bourgeois state-power: the first preserves it by displacing political 
analysis to a moralist and idealist critique of its worst “human” effects, 
the second seeks to accommodate itself within it. What the book did, 
then, was to consecrate the reformism of the labour movement, raise it 
to new heights of moral and cultural legitimacy, by offering to it values 
and symbols drawn in the main from the tradition of most entrenched 
political reaction.61
Finally, to these charges of reformism and idealism (the latter the result of “displaced 
political analysis”) Eagleton added the charge of populism. What he meant was the 
paradox by which Williams’s “belief in the need for a ‘common culture’ was continually 
crossed and confounded with an assertion of its present reality.”62 This resulted in 
“the contradictory position of opposing a crippling hegemony whose power he had 
simultaneously to deny.”63
Eagleton’s attack was premised upon a set of unspoken assumptions as to what 
constitutes a supposedly authentic Marxism. What were its attributes? Firstly, if 
labourism or Romanticism were only partially antagonistic to bourgeois state power, 
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then true Marxism would be “purely antagonistic.”64 Secondly, Marxism was not to be 
contaminated with labourism or reformism: Revolutionary politics is seen as almost 
categorically distinct from them. Thirdly, having criticised Williams for placing his 
own theory within the same horizon as the very writers he was analysing, it is obvious 
that for this Althusserian Eagleton a clear distinction must be drawn within Marxist 
theory between ideology and science: “For historical materialism stands or falls by 
the claim that it is not only an ideology, but that it contains a scientific theory of the 
genesis, structure, and decline of ideologies. It situates itself, in short, outside the 
terrain of competing long perspectives in order to theorise the conditions of their 
very possibility.”65
It took Williams several months to publish his response, “Notes on Marxism in 
Britain Since 1945.”66 It appeared, tellingly, in an issue of New Left Review notable 
for its emphasis on the problematic translation of the Russian revolutionary model 
to the advanced capitalist nations of Western Europe.67 Williams does not mention 
Eagleton by name, but responds methodically to almost every accusation levelled 
against him. In a characteristic opening, he takes issue with the terminology that 
forms the basis of the whole exchange: “Marxism,” he says, has changed its meaning 
several times since the war, depending on the specific political conjuncture in which 
it was active;68 likewise, the meaning of “Labour Left” has also constantly shifted, as 
has its relations to “Marxism.”69 In other words: “What ‘Marxism’ is at any time seems 
dependent, finally, less on the history of ideas, which is still amongst Marxists the 
usual way of defining it, than on the complex developments of actual social being and 
consciousness.”70 By using the key terms from Marx’s core formulation of historical 
materialism — namely, that social being determines consciousness and not the other 
way around — the cutting edge to this observation is clear: here, Eagleton is the 
idealist. The problem with Eagleton in this light is that he writes as if there existed 
some “pure … essence called Marxism.”71 
In that sense, he was an exemplar of the bad kind of what Williams named 
“legitimating theory,” one of the three theoretical strands he saw as constitutive of 
Marxist theory in Britain since 1945. Legitimating theory dealt with “the legitimate 
inheritance of an authentic Marxism”;72 “academic theory,” the second of the three 
strands, was concerned with the insertion or reinsertion of Marxism into a range of 
strictly academic work (“the question of ‘communism’ or one of its variants did not 
necessarily arise” in this context);73 finally, “operative theory” provided theoretical 
analyses of the specificities of late capitalist British society, with a view to intervening 
into it.74 Eagleton, the text implies, offered the worst of academic Marxist theory — 
his was an “academically congenial formalism”75 — and the least helpful aspect of 
legitimating theory: “it can lead, at its worst, to a series of self-alienating options, in 
which our real political presence is as bystanders, historians or critics of the immense 
conflicts of other generations and other places, with only marginal or rhetorical 
connections to the confused and frustrating politics of our own time and place.”76 
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Thus, for Williams, immanence is clearly a political principle: there is no ‘outside’ from 
which to look in; the outside is already a constitutive element of the inside. In that 
sense, the emphasis on the lived, or experience, in his work is not simply a residuum 
of petit-bourgeois ideology; it is a key component of his immanentist conception 
of politics. For Williams, experience names at once one’s mode of insertion into 
transindividual socio-matieral processes (one’s affective attachments, belongings, 
and alignments), and the constant imperative to remain one’s own contemporary: 
to dwell within the true processual depths of the present.
Williams develops his attack on Eagleton’s formalism when countering the 
accusation of populism. Like “Marxism” and “Labour Left,” the meaning of “populism” 
has shifted repeatedly depending on its political context. Marxism has been constantly 
imbricated with various forms of populism throughout its history, and was thus never 
as pure as Eagleton made out. Nonetheless, Williams states overtly that he had never 
been a populist “in the sense of that residual rhetoric”: “But because I saw the process 
as options under pressure, and knew where that pressure was coming from, I could 
not move either to the other most generally available position: that contempt of people 
… which makes the whole people, including the whole working class, mere carriers 
of the structures of a corrupt ideology.”77 Eagleton’s blanket generalisation always 
smacked of Brecht’s satirical remark that the government should dissolve the people 
and elect a new one; here, Williams hints at that angle, but adds to it a term taken 
from his reconfiguration of the Marxist concept of “determination.” He understood 
determination as both the “setting of limits” and the “exertion of pressures”; such 
pressures “are by no means only pressures against the limits … They are at least as 
often pressures derived from the formation and momentum of a given social mode: in 
effect a compulsion to act in ways that maintain and renew it.”78 By voiding theory of 
the lived, immanent pressures of daily existence, Eagleton’s formalism was not only 
contemptible in its abstract denigration of an entire class, but also politically futile in 
that it lacked all felt connection to contemporary political reality. The better solution, 
claims Williams, was to “stay with the existing resources; to learn and perhaps to 
teach new resources; to live the contradictions and the options under pressure so 
that … there was a chance of understanding them and tipping them the other way.”79 
Formalism, in this light, is the insubstantiality of a thought that has failed to absorb 
the lived pressures of a political reality, to process them and, in doing so, to transform 
them into positive political potential.
It is in the section on reformism that Williams takes on Eagleton’s self-proclaimed 
“pure antagonism” to bourgeois state power. He shows that at a pragmatic level 
reformism has always been a constitutive element of Marxism, not least because 
“a working-class political formation which does not respond to and represent the 
perceived, often short-term interests of the working class becomes impotent.”80 The 
problem with Eagleton’s revolutionary strategy is that it relies far too heavily — and 
ahistorically — on the Russian model of revolution (one which, as we have seen, this 
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issue of New Left Review was designed to interrogate). Williams argues that this model 
is premised upon “societies in which the political and social defences of the system 
were very much weaker, and with its consequent reliance on simple breakdown as 
the crisis of capitalism which makes possible the socialist transition.”81 By ignoring 
the complexly stratified layers of civil societies in advanced capitalist countries, 
ones which act as a buttress to the bourgeois state, Eagleton’s polemic is downright 
dangerous: “There is now a real danger, in a kind of theoretical opportunism leading 
to political, economic and sub-military (‘terrorist’) opportunism, of using the rhetoric 
against ‘reformism’ to the point where isolated militant sectors enter battles in which 
a totalizing alternative is precipitated against them.”82 What had seemed in Eagleton’s 
attack a version of a pure Marxism has ended up running the risk of a descent into 
“terrorism.” Indeed, one might even say that this is the limit case of immanence’s 
nemesis: the terrorism of transcendence. 
The principle of immanence thus generates, firstly, a methodology that seeks out 
the internal translatability between keywords and the historical situations of which 
they are constitutive elements, and, secondly, a politico-philosophical imperative that 
calls on theory to dwell within the pressures and contradictions of contemporary 
historical reality.
Long Revolution
Both principles — complexity and immanence — merge on the site of what has 
been interpreted as an absence in Williams’s work: his supposed lack of a theory of 
modernity.83 On one reading, of course, this is absurd; his entire oeuvre, structured as 
it is around the central notion of the long revolution, is nothing but an epic mapping 
out of modernity. Yet at the same time, it is true that Williams’s work does not 
overtly recognize a sense of modernity as a qualitatively new experience of time (an 
experience premised upon the primacy of novelty as such). The reasons for this are 
complex. It is quite clear that Williams’s theory of the emergent is implicitly premised 
upon the modern logic of temporal negation in its championing of the search for new 
social and artistic forms freshly adequate to new structures of feeling. Yet there is 
also a second, competing temporality at work in his writings: the time of tradition. 
The sheer strangeness of Williams’s conception of historical temporality is that it 
combines a valorization of novelty typical of modernity with an emphasis on the 
force of biological, generational and (relatively) unconscious attachments typical 
of tradition. Williams’s is precisely an immanent, self-conscious traditionality. It 
rejects the futurism of modernism, the desire abstractly to negate all traces of the 
past, by opening up the present to a consciousness of its attachments and selections 
— its determining lines of inheritance — the very traditional immanence of which 
means they cannot be simply wished away but must be worked through. Thus, 
it is not entirely true to say, as certain critics have done, that he lacks a theory of 
modernity: It would be more accurate to say that his conception of modernity is a 
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strictly oppositional one, in that it is a historically specific, political and theoretical 
rejection of the ideology of modernism — that mode of thought which believes it can 
break with the past by sheer voluntarism.84 
It is also a rejection of those incipient transcendent strands of Marxist thought 
which reduce revolution to a non-complex, immediate seizure of state power. What 
such approaches ignore — beyond their underestimation of the powerful, stratified 
layers of civil society — is precisely the necessity of working through those Ibsenite 
inherited debts that is central to Williams’s theory of revolution:
[…] I see revolution as the inevitable working through of a deep and tragic 
disorder, to which we can respond in varying ways but which will in 
any case, in one way or another, work its way through our world, as a 
consequence of any of our actions. I see revolution, that is to say, in a 
tragic perspective […].85
This “tragic perspective” has nothing in common with the vague, anti-communist 
pessimism so beloved of contemporary liberals. Nor should it be mistaken as an 
aestheticization of social reality; on the contrary, Williams is arguing that tragedy 
is, in Alberto Toscano’s words, “an experiential, narrative and political form.”86 He 
writes: “The tragic action, in its deepest sense, is not the confirmation of disorder, but 
its experience, its comprehension and its resolution. In our own time, this action is 
general, and its common name is revolution.”87 Whereas liberals construe the moment 
of revolutionary insurrection as an exceptional outbreak of violence and disorder, 
Williams argues that the capitalist social order is nothing but violence and disorder: 
revolution is the crisis and attempted resolution of this institutionalized disorder. He 
writes that “it is not simply that we become involved in this general crisis, but that we 
are already, by what we do and fail to do, participating in it.”88 Given that this is the 
case, “the only action that seems adequate is, really, a participation in the disorder, 
as a way of ending it.”89 As ever, the political principle — perhaps even the political 
ethic — of immanence forces us, firstly, to a realisation that we are already involved 
in specific historical processes, and secondly, to a proactive involvement in them as a 
way of transforming or ending them.
By echoing Aristotle’s argument that tragedy is a “whole action,”90 Williams 
extends both the social and temporal scope of what is conventionally understood 
by revolution. “[T]he absolute test,” he writes, “by which a revolution can be 
distinguished, is the change in the form of activity of a society, in its deepest structures 
of relationships and feeling.”91 It is here that what may initially have seemed primarily 
literary or cultural concerns with form become retrospectively revolutionary. For 
revolution means, not only seizing state power, but also working through — and, 
where necessary, transforming — all the inherited forms and social relations which 
enable the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. Certainly, many of the 
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principal forms will be related to economic production, but many others will relate to 
the deep “alignments” that constitute our very selves: our spontaneous ways of living 
and seeing the world.92 It is this stress on the wholeness of social revolution that also 
informs Williams’s later criticism of the Marxist category of the mode of production: 
“For the abstraction of production is a specialised and eventually ideological version 
of what is really in question, which is the form of human social relationships within 
a physical world.”93 Arguing that the notion of the ‘mode of production’ is too reliant 
on the capitalist definition of production (an argument he had already made in 1977 
regarding the term productive forces) 94 Williams prefers the term “way of life.”95 This 
seemingly vague term must be understood as an attempt to broaden the scope of the 
Marxist conception of totality and to connect it to the new social movements — of 
peace, ecology and feminism — which “are active and substantial in almost every area 
of life except [the economy]. It is as if everything that was excluded by the economic 
dominance and specialisations of the capitalist order has been grasped and worked 
on.”96 In such passages the logic of the structure of feeling assumes a revolutionary 
character: Williams is attempting to connect the revolutionary movement to precisely 
those elements of society which the capitalist order excludes.97 There is a direct 
connection here between the eloquent silences of naturalist drama and the areas of 
excluded sociality from which the new social movements emerged. Thus, the first 
major consequence of Williams’s understanding of revolution as a tragic whole action 
is his enlargement of the social scope of revolution; it is a scope whose complexity 
and existential depth defies both the simplifying inherited categories of capitalist 
social thought and the terroristic voluntarism of transcendent strands of Marxism.
The second consequence is his extension of the temporal scope of revolution: the 
long revolution. The meaning of this term shifted throughout Williams’s life. In the 
1961 book of that title, Williams distinguished between three revolutions which, 
together, constituted what most would call (though he often did not) modernity: 
the democratic, industrial, and cultural revolutions. The emphasis here was on the 
interrelation of the three revolutions, and the extreme difficulty of understanding 
them as a single process, not least because we find ourselves within it and many 
of the terms we use to investigate it were produced by it.98 By the time of Modern 
Tragedy (1966), however, long revolution came to refer to what Toscano has aptly 
described as “a long transition, immersed and entangled in the ponderous legacies and 
contradictions of the capitalist society it determinately negates.”99 Even with a sudden 
capture of power — a  short revolution — “the essential transformation is indeed 
a long revolution.”100 It is a protracted, potentially multi-generational process of 
working through the tragic disorder. By 1979, however, the Althusserian interviewers 
of the New Left Review were in no mood for gradualism dressed in sheep’s clothing. 
When pressed, Williams made two important amendments to the concept. Firstly, 
he cuts the ground from under the interviewers by giving a more precise definition 
than theirs of the short revolution: 
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It is accomplished when the central political organs of capitalist society 
lose their power of predominant social reproduction … The condition for 
the success of the long revolution in any real terms is decisively a short 
revolution, which I would define not so much in terms of duration as of 
the loss by the state of its capacity for predominant reproduction of the 
existing social relations.101
The second amendment sees the temporal duration of the long revolution extend, not 
only forwards beyond the short revolution, but backwards before it. The possibility 
of a short revolution in an advanced capitalist society “requires a considerable 
process of preparation which must not itself be limited to the immediate actions 
necessary to assure the transfer of power in a revolutionary situation.”102 Once 
again, what may have appeared at first to be relatively marginal linguistic concerns 
in the example of Williams’s work with the Workers’ Educational Association can 
be seen, retrospectively, as one instance of the long preparation for revolutionary 
transformation.
Conclusion
What I hope to have shown is that the unity of Williams’s life’s work consists in its 
constant, occasionally unorthodox, theorization of the long and difficult process 
of revolution. Everywhere guided by the political and theoretical principles of 
complexity and immanence, Williams’s work — from his writings on naturalist drama 
to his analyses of a nascent neoliberalism — offers patient and profound reflections 
on the enormous obstacles to, and utopian possibilities of, social revolution. Directed 
as much against the myopic voluntarism and potentially fatal short-termism of 
certain contemporary Marxisms as against the dominant capitalist social order he 
so despised, his oeuvre maps the uncharted depths of sociality at which the future 
will be decided. The words with which Williams concluded his 1979 interview with 
the New Left Review capture the interrelation of complexity and immanence in his 
vision of the long revolution; they remain, in Williams’s sense, emergent:
The challenge is therefore to a necessary complexity. I have been pulled all 
my life, for reasons we’ve discussed, between simplicity and complexity, 
and I can still feel the pull both ways. But every argument of experience 
and of history now makes my decision — and what I hope will be a 
general decision — clear. It is only in very complex ways that we can 
truly understand where we are. It is also only in very complex ways, and 
by moving confidently towards very complex societies, that we can begin 
that construction of many socialisms which will liberate and draw upon 
our real and now threatened energies.103
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